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ALTERNATIVES TO INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD
This panel was convened at 9:45 am, Thursday, April 4, by its moderator, Jason Yackee
of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who introduced the panelists: Barry Appleton of
Appleton & Associates; Andrea K. Bjorklund of the University of California at Davis School
of Law; Cliff Manjiao Chi of Xiamen University Law School; and C61ine Levesque of the
University of Ottawa.
THE SONG IS OVER: WHY IT'S TIME TO STOP TALKING ABOUT AN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION APPELLATE BODY

By Barry Appletont
My goal today is to stimulate scholarly discussion on one of the most contentious issues
that has arisen out of investor-state arbitration: the creation of an international treaty arbitration
appellate body. This longstanding debate has focused on a perceived lack of consistency
within international investment arbitration decisions and a need to have an appellate body
(or even some form of appellate investment treaty court) available to discipline "rogue
tribunals" which venture outside of the terms of the international economic law treaties.
I am suggesting that these types of appellate bodies are unnecessary and in any event, likely
a very bad idea. I suggest that it is time to put this discussion to rest and instead to focus
on the pernicious underlying symptoms which led us all to consider appellate mechanisms.
When one considers the implementation of an appellate body in the context of nearly
three thousand international economic law treaties, the mechanics suggested seem simply
unworkable. In my view, there are insurmountable impediments to the creation of an international investment law appellate body. For example, in 2002, the U.S. Trade Promotion Act
enabled the creation of an appellate body in future trade agreements.' This legislation provided
a three-year window to enable the creation of appellate body mechanisms. Despite the
legislative capacity, there was no appetite for such a process. During this three-year period,
no agreements were negotiated with appellate bodies. So the challenge of discussing the
operation of such an appellate body mechanism is simply that no international investment
treaty appellate body has been created.
There are solid reasons why no international investment treaty appellate bodies currently
exist. To be effective, an appellate body would require a wholesale amendment to the ICSID
Convention-an arduous task with a low probability of success within a short period of time.
The ICSID ad hoc annulment committee function is quite different from that exercised by
an appellate body and incompatible with the functions of an appellate body. The ICSID
system is self-contained and is essentially premised on the fact that ICSID panel decisions
are controlled through an ad hoc annulment system. Antonio Parra, a former deputy SecretaryGeneral of ICSID, was the author of a thoughtful discussion paper which considered ways
Professor Bjorklund did not submit remarks for the Proceedings.
Barry Appleton is an international lawyer specializing in international economic law. He is the Managing
Partner of Appleton & Associates International Lawyers in Toronto and Washington, D.C. Mr. Appleton thanks
ASIL's International Economic Law Interest Group for the opportunity to present these remarks, which do not
necessarily reflect the views of his firm or its clients.
'Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 USC §3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2002).
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in which ICSID could use its rules to effectively implement an appellate body. 2 Parra's paper
concluded that such a process could actually take place in the absence of an amendment to
the ICSID Convention through a general inter se agreement between state parties to go to
an appellate body after the tribunal of first instance.3 Such an approach has challenges in
that it must modify the ad hoc annulment process in ICSID to have it operate as an appellate
mechanism. This route does have its challenges. 4
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has recently permitted the public to sit in on some
of its appellate body hearings. I attended such a public hearing of the WTO Appellate Body,
which provided an opportunity to observe a previously closely guarded process that the
public generally does not have an opportunity to see. I witnessed the hard work done by the
WTO Appellate Body to find consistency within the WTO's international economic law
decisionmaking. An appellate body is best suited to address questions where there is substantial similarity in investment obligations between the parties. This is the case at the WTO.
This could also be the case where there is a series of investment protection agreements based
on the same model treaty, or a multilateral agreement such as NAFTA. In these situations,
there is a possibility that an appellate body could be structured to make that work. But even
in these cases where there is sufficient similarity in the substantive obligations of the treaties,
there still are real questions about the practicalities of an appellate body. For example, would
an appellate mechanism create two classes of arbitrators, with junior and senior arbitrators
much like one finds in municipal appeals courts? This also raises the concern of whether
this new process would disrupt the overall effectiveness of international economic law
adjudication.
This is not to say that creating an appellate body within the constraints of current international investment treaties is impossible, but that it is difficult. There are ways to integrate
an appellate system into some existing regional international investment treaty agreements.
For example, NAFTA could permit the creation of an appellate body in the event that the
treaty was amended. Regional investment treaties could also permit the creation of appellate
mechanisms. But in every set of existing treaties, there are practical and political difficulties
in modifying the treaty that hardly makes the creation of an appellate body worth the cost.
This review of the objectives that could be remedied by an appellate body necessitates a
more fundamental consideration of the question about whether there really is a problem that
needs to be addressed by an appellate body. My answer to this question is no.
Much of the current debate about an appellate body has actually been misplaced by having
a focus on whether a particular tribunal or a particular arbitrator has had "pro-investor" or
"pro-state" leanings. This simplistic two-sided view of international economic law is inadequate to explain how an appellate body might actually operate. At its most basic, this bipolar
2 Antonio R. Parra, Possible Improvements of the Frameworkfor ICSID Arbitration,ICSID Secretariat Discussion
Paper, Oct. 22, 2004.
See the discussion on this topic in id., annex.
4 I am indebted to comments on these remarks from Professor Robert Howse from the Faculty of Law at New
York University who points out that the state parties involved in an ICSID dispute (that is, the respondent state
and state of the investor) could enter into a specific agreement to permit an appellate body to operate in the ICSID
dispute without the need for an amendment to the ICSID Convention. In such a circumstance, the rules of international
law require a demonstration that the ICSID Convention does not contain a lex specialis that would otherwise
preclude recourse to Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. Article 41 addresses inter se amendments to multilateral
treaties. Any modification to permit an appellate body process would have to ensure that the change was not to
the detriment of other state parties. All modifications would need to be notified in advance to all treaty parties,
and the modification could not otherwise be incompatible with the fundamental purpose of treaty. Such a process
has not been followed by a party, and thus the response from an affected claimant has also not been considered
in this approach.
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view is fundamentally the wrong dialectic lens to consider this area of the law. Such a view
creates a series of questions and approaches that are irrelevant to the fundamental issue to
be addressed. This is where the problems do arise.
IMPROPER APPLICATION OF RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

States have negotiated treaties. These same states expect tribunals to give effect to the
words of the treaty when they are interpreted as these words were carefully negotiated. But
often tribunals ignore the wording in the treaty. A failure properly to interpret the words of
a treaty can easily result in inconsistent decisions between tribunals considering the same
substantive treaty provision. It can also result in an excess of jurisdiction or an error of law.
Many of the problems arise fundamentally from the lack of proper application of international law. Fundamental and basic concepts such as those contained in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties and the JLC Draft Articles on State Responsibility are often not
followed in the interpretation of international economic law treaties. When the proper rules
of international law have not been applied, or are applied inconsistently or improperly, there
is going to be a problem. By the time an appellate body is in place, the damage by the
tribunal has been done. Appellate mechanisms were to address this type of fundamental
problem where the rule of law is ignored because customary rules of international law have
not been applied. In essence, this is a system where carelessness and lawlessness, rather than
the application of the rule of law, applies.
The fundamental concern that needs to be addressed is to ensure that high standards of
professionalism and competence are maintained by these international economic law tribunals.
The issue is not really about the need for an appellate body. Instead, the need is to ameliorate
the tribunal process. An improved process starts with having tribunals comprising the best
possible arbitrators, who are ready to address the issues in a dispute based on the application
of rules of international law to the terms of the particular treaty at issue.
There are lessons that can be learned from domestic arbitration procedures. A number of
these domestic procedures require mandatory certification before an arbitrator can be appointed to a tribunal. Such an approach is followed in arbitrations before the International
Center for Dispute Resolution or by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. In matters before
these arbitration institutions, one cannot be named as an arbitrator until there is a demonstrated
certification of competency. For international economic law arbitration, a potential arbitrator
should be able to demonstrate knowledge of the rules of international law and international
arbitration procedure that is sufficient to establish the issuance of a proper decision. Simple
mechanisms could be put into place for an arbitrator to demonstrate the achievement of these
basic standards, and disputing parties appointing arbitrators could look for this certification
before making appointments.
The current situation is ripe for bad decisionmaking. It facilitates inconsistency rather
than enhancing stability and predictability from a consistent meaning and application of
international investment treaty norms. This is the most practical and immediate area where
reform could be implemented by institutions that engage in a good deal of appointments,
such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration or ICSID. These practical measures should be
considered by international lawyers engaged in this area of law as well.
Reviewing investor-state arbitration decisions demonstrates just how helpful recourse to
the rules of international law would be to the determination of issues raised. Many questions
could be resolved by a simple reference to the rules contained in the ILC Draft Articles on
State Responsibility. These rules provide a trier of fact with a great deal of information. For
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example, the ILC Draft Articles provide a codified (and sensible) international economic
law approach to approach essential questions on the attribution of state responsibility that
frequently need to be considered within international economic law claims.
A lack of demonstrated competency in international economic law and procedure is also
a problem for WTO dispute settlement panels. The failures of these panels to appreciate the
required legal tests, and thus to adduce the proper evidence, have made effective appellate
review impossible by the WTO Appellate Body, which has no power to obtain new evidence
or make its own findings of fact de novo. Again, there is no requirement for competencybased certification to be a panelist at the WTO. 5 So the same problems manifest themselves
at the WTO and at the investor-state level.6
In conclusion, the likelihood of an appellate mechanism being created within the contours
of the current network of international economic law treaties remains very low. Substantive
reforms to enable the creation of an appellate body within key international investment treaty
institutions such as ICSID are nonstarters. The simplest and most productive way to enhance
the effectiveness and consistency of international economic law tribunals is to ensure that
the persons with demonstrated knowledge about the rules of international law are appointed
to international economic law tribunals.
This is the time finally to address the underlying problem that arises when there is a lack
of rigor in tribunal decisionmaking. I suggest, given the difficulties in creating an appellate
body, that it is time to stop focusing simply on appellate mechanisms and instead take up
the real challenge to ensure consistent recourse to rules of international law in the interpretation
of international treaties. The song about appellate mechanisms is finished, and it is now time
to be singing a different tune.
PRIVILEGING DOMESTIC REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

By Manjiao Chi*
There are various methods to settle international investment disputes between states and
foreign investors at the international and national levels. Typical methods include investorstate negotiation, consultation, mediation or/and arbitration, local remedies in the host states,
state-state arbitration, or diplomatic protection. These methods have their respective merits
and disadvantages and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Many international investment
agreements (HAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and regional trade agreements (RTAs)
5 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding does specify that WTO panelists need to be qualified. But this
requirement has not been spelled out in a meaningful way that could provide guidelines for appointments. The
resource constraints and tight timeframes for the WTO Appellate Body effectively make it impossible for the WTO
Appellate Body to compensate for errors of competency and professionalism which occur at the panel level.
6 It is important to make clear that there are many qualified and experienced international economic law arbitrators
who sit on investor-state arbitration tribunals, but a requirement for demonstrated knowledge of the rules of
international law is simply not a prerequisite for appointment to a tribunal. This results in circumstances where
there can be international investment treaty arbitration panels without any member having demonstrated knowledge
of international economic law. This is a practical and identifiable way to be able to deal with the public policy
concerns which have resulted in a call for an appellate body solution. My proposal is that scholars, arbitrators,
arbitration institutions, and international economic law lawyers all have a vested interest in enhancing international
economic law-and that ensuring professionalism and competency as a fundamental requirement of the system is
a practical way to be able to address the issues of potential inconsistency and incorrectness in tribunal decisions.
* Associate Professor of Law, Law School, Xiamen University, China; Deputy Secretary-General, the Administrative Council, Xiamen Academy of International Law; Research Fellow, Collaborative Innovation Center for Global
Governance and Rule of Law, Xiamen University.

